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Robert Henman’s article, Can brain scanning 
and imaging techniques contribute to a theory of 
thinking?(Henman, 2013) came to my attention 
recently. My own work over the years has includ-
ed applications of mathematics in the biological 
sciences, collaboration in experimental work in 
biochemistry, as well as work in the philosophy 
of the biological sciences. Henman suggests 
something that, at present, would be out of the 
ordinary. As I understand it, throughout the paper 
he develops the view that “refl ection on one’s 
own performance” would contribute to helping 
us move toward an improved heuristics in the 
biological sciences and, in particular, would help 
us toward better identifying reductionist views. 
In the last section of his article Henman 
points to what Bernard Lonergan called “gener-
alized empirical method”:  Generalized empir-
ical method operates on a combination of both 
the data of sense and the data of conscious-
ness: it does not treat of objects without tak-
ing into account the corresponding operations 
of the subject: it does not treat of the subject’s 
operations without taking into account the cor-
responding object (Lonergan, 1985, p. 141).
A method that would include attention to oper-
ations would be new. But, is it needed? Is such 
a method even feasible? These questions are for 
the community to gradually sort out. Still, it is 
possible to draw attention here to questions that, 
in various ways, continue to surface in the con-
temporary biological sciences: How are we to 
assemble, order, hold together, or move forward, 
with increasingly vast ranges of aggregates of 
results from developing areas such biophysics; 
biochemistry; neurochemistry; behavioural sci-
ence; and cognitive science (Agoritas and Guyatt, 
2013),1 and the many emergent interdisciplinary 
areas of specialization?  The evidence is that they 
all have important contributions to make. At the 
same time, each area has its own expertise, its 
own data, its own understandings and strategies.
Henman suggests the possibility of a develop-
ment in method for biological sciences that 
would not only be informed by results from each 
area, but would include attention on what one is 
doing in each area to get those results. Such a 
tandem approach would help meet the challenge 
described in the previous paragraph. Learn-
ing how to implement such a method would, 
though, be a long term project for the scientifi c 
community, and would involve a major shift. 
Yet, developments in method are not new in the 
history of science, so that in itself should not 
discourage. Henman’s section on Generalized 
Empirical Method includes helpful preliminary 
pointers toward what would be an important de-
velopment in scientifi c method. Admittedly, a 
generalized empirical method is rather remote 
to present practice. But such a method would 
be coherent with the essential dynamics of sci-
entifi c progress, and if implemented, promises 
to be a way toward new and practical results.
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1: “…with now more than 2000 articles published 
in MEDLINE every day… Clinicians therefore need 
resources that fi lter, appraise, and synthesize the evidence 
…” (Agoritsas and Guyatt, 2013, p.448).
REFERENCES
Henman R. (2013) Can brain scanning and imaging 
techniques contribute to a theory of thinking? Dial Phil 
Ment Neuro Sci, 6:49-56.
Lonergan B. (1985) A Third collection. Paulist Press, New 
York.
Agoritsas T, Guyatt G. (2013). Evidence-based medicine 
20 years on: A view from the inside. Can J Neurol Sci, 
40:448-449.
